- Mr. Michael, European and American significant circles assessed bringing charges against the former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili negatively. Saakashvili and his team members state that political persecution takes place against them. According to the government, it acts according to the principle – everyone is equal before the law. We understand that in the USA and Europe Georgia is perceived as the country of transitional democracy where political persecution and selective justice may take place, but it is obligation of the Georgian justice to find out this. How would you evaluate all that happened, the steps made by new government of Georgia and sharp reaction of American and European politicians?

- The charges filed by the Prosecutor’s Office may be politically unwise, but they involve incidents -- the 2007 crackdown and the Imedi TV raid -- that are incontrovertibly serious. Though the response from the West has been sharp, the incidents pose serious questions to those that are reflexively pro-Saakashvili. Labeling the investigation as “selective justice” would not seem to apply in this case; selective justice implies that certain people are being singled out for crimes that a number of others have likely also committed. For the events in 2007, however, only Saakashvili and select members of his inner circle could have possibly been responsible for alleged crimes on this scale. Saakashvili’s defenders in the West, however, seem largely unconcerned with matters of justice. Saakashvili remains a symbol of Westernization and anti-Russian sentiment, and the purity of that symbol is seen by certain Westerners as more important than addressing very real excesses committed by the previous government.

But that does not mean that going after Saakashvili is a politically wise decision. The charges have the unfortunate effect of retroactively legitimizing claims by Western European leaders that Georgia is “unready” for more substantial integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Of course, this is only an excuse by certain European officials to obscure their actual fear of Russian retaliation, but Georgia should not be giving skeptics more reason to slow or stop Euro-Atlantic integration.

At the same time, the Georgian government’s chief obligation is to its own people, and there are many unanswered questions from the previous government’s tenure. But an important question to consider is whether Georgian citizens would rather see Misha dragged through the criminal justice system, or for the justice system to return expropriated land, free those wrongly imprisoned, and build democratic structures to ensure such things never happen again? I would suspect they would choose the latter every time.

- Everybody knows that the previous government contributed greatly to transform and reform the Georgian society and state, but at the same time we all know that the previous government made a lot of mistakes. The mistakes influenced the attitude of our society towards them negatively. Everybody knew that the former president would have supporters in the USA and Europe but unfortunately, attitude of our society greatly depends on the position of Washington and Brussels towards Saakashvili and his team. From you points of view, do the American political elite realize negative aspects of the strange reality?

- I do not think that the American political establishment, as a whole, knows very much about the previous government’s record or the attitudes of Georgians towards that government. The reality is that most Americans, including in the political establishment, simply do not think about Georgia very often and when they do, they are as likely to rely on personal relationships or emotions as hard facts. Of the small community that focuses on the Caucasus in the West, many of those that are closest to power hold outdated or outright inaccurate views of the previous government’s record and of Georgia as a whole.

One problem is that many see Georgia through a high-level, binary aperture. Georgia is not a place of its own as much as a representation of some other bias or combination of beliefs: personal relationships; political or economic ideologies; views towards Russia; the legacy of the Bush administration’s “democracy agenda”; color revolutions; and the like. The unfortunate truth is that the vast majority of discourse within Western circles about Georgia is about reaffirming those biases and not about what is best for Georgia the country and its people.

- It is not surprising that European and American politicians do not trust in the Georgian justice, but the government may want to create a precedent of the principle – everybody is equal before the law. It may have other political aims but as the Georgian justice has not concluded anything and Mikheil Saakashvili himself does not give evidence, is it early to make conclusions?

- Theoretically, yes, it is too early to make conclusions, particularly given the gravity of the cases being investigated. However, again, much of the opposition to investigating Saakashvili has little to do with actual concerns about the justice system. Looking at it this way, it’s never too early or too late to jump to conclusions if the only “correct answer” is exonerating Saakashvili or his allies.

- On international arena, bringing charges against Mikheil Saakashvili and his team members is said to have negative results for Georgia. How will this case influence European integration and NATO aspirations of Georgia?

- Realistically, it will not have any major effect. For one thing, whatever momentum there is for Georgian integration will not be derailed because of Saakashvili. The Association Agreement will not be suspended and whatever the final “substantive package” that comes out of the NATO summit in Wales will be, it will not be modified just because Misha is being investigated. What it will do, however, is offer additional rhetorical ammunition to opponents of Georgian Euro-Atlantic integration.

- The world has suddenly changed because of the Kremlin participates in the Ukrainian developments. The reaction from Washington and Europe to annexation of Crimea and Russia’s destructive action in eastern Ukraine was not expressed immediately at the beginning, but now it is clear that Europe and the USA are fighting together by means of imposing economic sanctions on Russia. How would you assess the situation of international relations in the backgrounds of the Ukrainian crisis?

- The inescapable reality is that the U.S. and Europe is simply not unified over Russia and Ukraine. There is a sharply heterogeneous threat assessment not only between the U.S. and Europe, but within Europe itself. While issuing joint economic sanctions is a positive step, it is hard to conclude that the West is working off the same rubric when several European states continue to adhere to their arms contracts with Moscow and Ukraine has been essentially left to fight against Russian proxies on its own. The U.S. sees Russia as not only a threat to Ukraine or Eastern Europe, but to the wider Euro-Atlantic security architecture so painstakingly developed since the end of the Second World War. Yet Washington, despite this realization, is not yet sure to what degree it is prepared to commit to withstanding Russian aggression. There is a consensus that no one wants a kinetic conflict with Russia, and it is upon this basis that Moscow continues to operate with impunity.

Meanwhile, Europe is deeply divided over the more basic question of the Russian threat itself. There is an alarming complacency over the Russian annexation of Crimea and a basic unwillingness among certain European powers to confront the reality of aggressive Russian revanchism on its periphery. If there is any one country that is responsible for blunting Russian militarism in Ukraine, it is the Ukrainian government itself, which has refused to allow itself to be carved and sold to Russia by the inaction -- or even the countenance -- of the West.

- The west and the Kremlin fixed their positions in respect of Ukraine. How will processes develop in the nearest future?

- The sanctions are a positive development, but it is likely that the Russian leadership foresaw sanctions -- and perhaps even more punishing sanctions than these -- as a consequence for its actions in Ukraine. If sanctions are to be effective, they need time to squeeze the Russian economy and its elite to create enough hardship to render Moscow willing to come to a more accommodating negotiating position.

But that is time that Ukraine and the West may not have. With a large buildup again on the Russia-Ukraine border and credible evidence mounting of increasing direct Russian involvement in separatist Ukrainian rebellions, it is well within the realm of possibility that sanctions won’t be given time to work before the situation in Ukraine further escalates. When it comes down to it, the West is trying to withstand Russian military aggression using limited (and varying) economic means -- and yet somehow there is confusion as to why it isn’t working.

- The U.S. President Barack Obama said – ‘’If Russia stops supporting Separatists and rebels in eastern Ukraine, sanctions against it will be removed.’’ As the Euro Commissioner Stefan Fule said, ‘’Bringing Crimea back to Ukraine is only the matter of time’’. We have an impression as if Washington has more loyal position in respect of Crimea. Is it possible to say that the USA and Europe have different program minimum and maximum by imposing economic sanctions?

- Absolutely. As I noted above, the U.S. and Europe have very different threat perceptions of the situation and are not working from the same playbook. This is understandable in many ways, as Europe has greater macroeconomic exposure to Russia than the U.S., which is far more insulated by comparison. However, this is exactly the case where Europe can demonstrate that its ability to wield soft power -- which it has long heralded as its contribution to global stability in lieu of hard power -- can be used to confront aggression. So far, the signs are not encouraging.

- The Russian media often spread false information as if ‘’the US Congress adopted the bill according to which Washington states that Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are its strategic partners and it takes responsibility for their security.’’ It is known that such a bill has been initiated to the Congress, but presumably it will not be adopted. If the Karabakh conflict is tensed by Russia and the latter becomes more active in the Caucasian Region, is it possible the Congress to adopt the bill mentioned above?

- The bill may or may not be adopted. It’s still in committee and it’s an open question as to whether or not it will reach a floor vote. This is something where all that money that Georgia spends on lobbyists ought to be put to good use -- Georgia should press for this, or a bill like it, to get bipartisan support and be put to a floor vote.

With the way US Congressional politics works, the bill is much more likely to see progress if it becomes a priority of the administration or at least senior elements of the Democratic party to help move it forward. Geopolitics may play a role in that process, but there is already a significant geopolitical case for such an initiative to be adopted. It is up to Georgia and its friends in Congress to push for making this a reality.